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Introduction
While individual accounts vary, most planners would agree that their calling, historically, 
has been bound up with the idea of bringing an 
increased measure of rationality to collective 
human activities. Since the late 1960s, however, 
traditional neo-positivist models of scientific 
problem solving and systematic administration 
have come increasingly under the gun. Urban 
riots, ecological disasters and the failure of the first 
UN Development Decade proved a damning 
indictment. By the early 1970s, new voices were 
being heard, calling for a different, more certain 
method of linking knowledge to action. Planning 
for turbulence through social learning was 
suggested as an alternative approach, and its 
emphasis on learning from practice has led to an 
ever increasing identity on the part of many 
planning theoreticians with the materialist concept 
of praxis. Both radical and liberal thinkers have 
come to endorse quite similar epistemological 
positions.
In this paper I will briefly criticize the increasingly 
orthodox learning/action model of planning, which 
for convenience I will refer to as ‘LAM’, and then 
I will go on to suggest some of the important 
components of another perspective which I have 
called wilful community action. My central 
argument is that LAM is extremely inconsistent 
and at least as naive, in several aspects, as the 
rational/systems paradigm it has replaced. A 
workable theory of planned action is not so much 
concerned with anotology as with results. ‘True 
knowledge’ is less important than belief which can 
be linked to accessible community power. The
role of the irrational in defining what is 
operationally ‘true’ and do-able must be openly 
confronted. And questions like ‘Who Plans?’ and 
‘What is the planner’s role?’ must be given 
defensible answers.
Planning on the LAM
The rational/systems view of planning has been all 
but superseded by what might be called 
lightheartedly ‘planning on the LAM’, a sort of 
anti-planning theory of planning. Although the 
new paradigm is only now beginning to achieve 
respectability, its main contributors and central 
tenets are well established. The major writers have 
been drawn primarily from three groups:
• the ‘radical planners’, including Davidoff,
Goodman, Grabow and Heskin;
• the ‘learning theorist’, represented by
Dunn, Friedmann, Hampden-Tumer and
Schon; and
• the ‘theoreticians of praxis’, such as
Arendt, Feyerabend, Habermas, Mao
Tse-Tung and Vazquez.
The most frequently cited examples of successful 
planning practice under LAM are the ‘Chinese 
path to development’, and, more recently, the 
various Western European community 
participation movements.
In simplified form, LAM states that the methods of 
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society. Each social setting is unique, and 
knowledge can only be gained and applied by self- 
conscious groups of people working through actual 
planning practice on concrete problems. The 
transferability of planning knowledge is all but 
limited to the internalized problem-solving ability 
carried around by experienced individuals. And 
since outcomes are always unsure, on politico- 
moral as well as epistemological grounds, the 
people affected by a decision must be responsible 
for making it. Devolution is, thus, an intrinsic part 
of the doctrine.
In attempting to collapse the dichotomy between 
the ideal and the real, LAM goes a long way in 
correcting the particular excesses of its 
predecessor, and this simple description is not 
meant to be a caricature. But there are several 
inherent weaknesses in its argument which deserve 
serious examination. Probably the most glaring of 
these is (1) the assumed relationship between 
‘truth’ and successful action in any given situation; 
it being assumed that ‘true knowledge’ is 
necessary for solving social problems. This leads 
directly into the second consideration, (2) the 
question of rationality. The learning/action model 
of planning adheres doggedly to the idea that 
workable solutions to human problems rest on a 
functional base of cause and effect relationships. 
It posits that action can and should be directed by 
‘what can be discovered to work’, in relatively 
direct, mechanistic terms. The irrational and 
emotional elements of experience, on both the 
personal and communal levels, remain outside the 
realm of discourse. This, then, leaves two further 
gaps in the LAM theory: (3) the relationship of 
planning and the planner to real, observed social 
action, and (4) the role of effective political power 
in implementing planning decisions.
I will comment on each of these problems and then 
attempt to suggest some of the characteristics of an 
alternative theory which faces them head-on.
The fetishism about science is a leftover from the 
19th century, but a real, continuing problem. If we 
look even briefly at the more noteworthy 
publications in the LAM traditions, it becomes 
quickly evident, as in the midst of any paradigm 
shift, that a good deal of time and space is devoted 
to dragon killing. Many pages and much 
intellectual energy are allotted to a debunking and
post-mortem of August Comte, in his many 
incarnations. Liberal social science is taken to task 
on both epistemological and political grounds, 
mainly cantering around the obvious elements of 
sociology of knowledge - the question of free will, 
the inability to predict social events, and the 
importance of politics to social knowledge. 
Depending on the author, science and society are 
attributed varying degrees of misfit.
The irony in all this is, of course, that the same 
writers tum around, from a respectful distance, and 
resurrect the slain beast. In some form or another 
an approximation of the scientific method, 
reminiscent perhaps of Marx or Dewey is 
advocated, and it is argued that ‘processed 
knowledge’ is a continuing imperative for planned 
social action. Even if various teleological 
elements are added and sundry methodological 
constraints are removed, in fact, science still reigns 
supreme. The magic of planning is to connect an 
appropriate technique for discovering causal 
knowledge with the proper social institutions to 
embody and act upon it.
The basis of this tenacious attachment to ‘science’ 
on the part of planners is easily explainable in 
terms of planning history, if less than satisfying in 
recorded results. As a reform movement whose 
origins overlap the tum of the last century, 
planning hoped and promised to change the 
appalling human condition under the rule of 
industrial capitalism, through the introduction of a 
scientific viewpoint, the application of technology 
to social problems, and the establishment of 
scientific modes of administration. Whether in 
Russia after the revolution or Chicago during the 
heyday of big business, rationality in public affairs 
was the sacred held high to banish the profane of 
poverty and privilege. Few would argue today, 
however, that social justice, humane urban growth 
patterns, and controlled, yet adequate economic 
development were the outcomes. The relationship 
between scientific knowledge and social reform 
has proven problematic at best. One might ask if 
substantive cause and effect relationships are even 
a relevant consideration in most social decisions, 
and whether planners are not perhaps faced with a 
very fundamental choice: science or social change.
Nevertheless, and despite their own arguments 









































South African Planning Journal 42 June 1997 21
perception and cognition, some form of rationality 
remains the sanctifying principle for most 
planners. Whether it is a little-modified line of 
deductive reasoning or the ‘logic of action’, 
rationality is championed as the necessary decision 
principle in choosing information for planning. 
The fact that ‘logic’ is almost entirely conditioned 
by upbringing or that thought chains are utterly 
riddled with ‘non-rational’ elements is continually 
neglected. An admission of irrationality seems 
taboo, and no real limits to functional knowledge 
are recognized.
Part of the reason for this continuing call for 
science and rationality among LAM paradigm 
planners is involved with the question ‘Who 
plans?’ and a natural professional conservatism. 
Taking the LAM critique of neo-positivism at face 
value, the query immediately comes to mind, who 
should do the planning and what should be their 
assigned role in social change? The answer is just 
as forceful: people organize and plan for 
themselves, and there is no real role for an 
expediter. Even for most LAM theoreticians, 
however, this position seems unsatisfactory': Isn’t 
it true that people take only limited interest in 
public affairs? Only pressing disaster seems to 
move them! And then only until the immediate 
crisis is resolved. Continuing, positive action 
seems impossible without someone to oversee the 
whole process.
But such a line of argument is genuinely out of 
tune with the times. There must be a less 
authoritarian justification! So once again science 
enters the picture although, admittedly, this time, 
mixed with such irrational consideration as 
‘commitment’ and ‘readiness to serve’. 
Discussions appear calling for an admixture of 
scientific and common-sense knowledge as the 
basis for planning, although, on first glance at 
least, science has already been dismissed as 
inapplicable. Thus the debate continues over the 
respective roles of planners and clients (or the 
avant-guarde and the masses), without any 
admissible explanation of the planner’s existence. 
Planners continue to exercise power and write 
about planning, but their own arguments lend them 
very little legitimacy.
Finally we come to the question of implementation 
and its relation to political power. Carried to its
farthest extreme, in learning theory circles, 
knowledge becomes something obtained almost 
entirely through practice. So the problem of 
‘implementation’ never becomes pertinent. 
Planning is a fait accompli. No-one has to worry 
how it will get done. Similarly, among the neo- 
marxist left, power is by definition mobilized for 
the accomplishment of public purposes which 
serve the common interest. So once again, 
theoretically, implementation is not a pressing 
concern. However, the reality of both these 
situations is vastly different from the 
advertisements.
Implementation takes genuine mobilization of 
social power. Within the limits of technical and 
economic capacity, it means getting people excited 
and supportive of something. It means getting the 
levers of power to move in the right direction. The 
power can only be avoided at a theoretical level. 
Without effective implementation, manifestly, 
planning remains only as successful as the 
Tanzanian Ujamaa Village Scheme, or the US 55 
mph speed limit.
Planning and the will to power
If one accepts many of the critical assertions of the 
learning/action model of planning, but has 
difficulty with its positive prescriptions, what are 
the alternatives? A return to ‘rational planning’ 
would hardly seem to be the answer. I think a 
useful approach can be suggested, however. It lies 
in the direction of what I have called wilful 
community action. In a non-teleological world, 
where positivist social science has lost its 
credibility, there must and will continue to be an 
accepted body of knowledge about social reality, 
a world view if you will. This image of things 
changes from group to group and place to place, 
imbedded as it is in their shared culture by their 
own particular historical experience. By way of 
example, in Watts or in Pays Basque, for the 
people that live there, the world is their 
representation. Seen another way, it might be 
described as a projection of themselves, a 
sublimation of their own will (Schopenhauer, 
1966). Within the theoretically undefinable 
bounds of some sort of reality principle, whether 
such a worldview is ‘true’ is not of immediate 
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and motivation by which society functions. The 
task for anyone who would play an active role in 
social life is to identify and help transform the 
group’s will vis-a-vis particular concrete situations. 
This is typically a slow, painful communal 
process. No one can, in fact, conceivably control 
and manipulate it. But it is only through exercise 
of the community will (wilful community action) 
that problems are identified, acted upon and over­
come (Nietzsche, 1973).
Knowledge as a community’s worldview or 
representation has several distinctive features, 
including specificity, limitedness, irrationality, and 
action-orientation. I will attempt to sketch out the 
meaning and implications of each of these 
attributes.
Specificity: First of all, any community’s 
worldview is limited to its own experience and the 
ideas it has absorbed in one form or another from 
other groups. This means that its representation of 
the world is particular and localized. By definition 
then, it suggests that there will be other views of 
the same events, from other perspectives; indeed, 
what are social problems for one social group may 
not even be identified as existing from another 
worldview. The most immediate conclusion to be 
drawn from such an argument is that only people 
who live in a particular environment and 
understand it (know) it though a particular 
viewpoint can possibly plan for it. This is not to 
suggest that there is no systematic or special 
knowledge, but rather that planners, whoever they 
may be, can only be drawn from their own 
communities.
Limitedness: Another related feature is the notion 
of limitation. Since not all things enter into a 
particular cultural perspective, only those that fit 
within the community’s world view can be 
employed to prompt them to action. This can 
present a terrible conservative bias, which I would 
argue is to be encountered daily in all human 
affairs. But there is absolutely no point in 
avoiding it or denying its existence! 
Transformation of limited knowledge is an 
exercise in community education; a task of the first 
order, requiring genuine cultural change, and, 
therefore, significant amounts of time. It is one of 
the planner’s roles and provides legitimate grounds 
for hopeful, if extended, work by learning
theorists.
Irrationality: Specific, limited knowledge has a 
two-dimensional relationship to irrationality. It 
contains both rational and irrational elements 
(from either a positivist or Marxist definition of 
rationality, for instance) and so must be 
approached in an appropriate manner. Some ideas 
are held because of the effective component of 
attitude; at the community level this could take a 
host of relevant forms, such as immense pride in a 
particular aspect of community self-image. Still 
further afield from traditional planning 
considerations are communally shared concepts 
which are a product of almost pure emotion, like a 
fear for bodily safety, portrayed by burdensome 
community expenditures or extremely restrictive 
regulation of public behaviour.
From a second perspective, information which is 
functional operational in a given situation (viz., 
‘rational’) might be excluded from a particular 
group’s world view, making it, for all practical 
purposes, irrelevant to planned action. No amount 
of reality testing or other forms of 
experimentation, in the short run at least, will 
change this, no matter how practical the 
innovation should prove to be. Yet at the same 
time, if a new concept is incorporated into a 
community’s worldview it can significantly 
change social relationships, even to the point of 
markedly altering the status of formerly favoured 
vested interests.
Action-orientation: Finally we come to the prime 
link between knowledge and the implementation of 
planning, the tie between community will and 
action. Action is direct manifestation of a group’s 
collective will. Since both knowledge and action 
are functions of community will, there is, once 
again, a built-in bias toward the status quo but no 
unbridgeable gap between the two. Here the 
planner’s role becomes one of helping to bring 
consistency to the knowledge/action continuum 
and attempting to encourage transformation of the 
communal will. Such a task may be Herculean, 
but is not impossible, for behavioural change does 
occur. And from this perspective, both knowledge 
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Summary comments
Wilful community action is still a nebulous 
concept. It needs much exploration and 
refinement. But I think it offers the foundation for 
a useful theory of planing. With the demise of the 
rational/systems approach to planning, a void has 
been created which the learning/action model has 
been, as yet, unable to fill. The main problems in 
the LAM formation are:
(1) an ambiguous attitude toward the role of
science in planning,
(2) an inability to define a legitimate role for the
apparently unavoidable continuing presence of the
planner, and
(3) an unrealistic attitude vis-a-vis the evident
constraints of community power.
Wilful community action makes a first 
approximation of overcoming these shortcomings. 
It does not have an overwhelming stake in the 
successful re-definition of science; its 
epistemological basis lies elsewhere. Planners are 
assigned a meaningful, legitimate role in social 
change, identifying and transforming the world 
view which they share with other members of their 
own social group. And social power is 
acknowledged and built-in to the concept as a 
fundamental object of planning concern. Its use 
may prove difficult, but its importance is given 
centre stage.
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